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Abstract
We discuss the influence of information contagion on the dynam-
ics of choices in social networks of heterogeneous buyers. Starting
from an inhomogeneous cellular automata model of buyers dynamics,
we show that when agents try to adjust their reservation price, the
tatonement process does not converge to equilibrium at some interme-
diate market share and that large amplitude fluctuations are actually
observed. When the tatonnement dynamics is slow with respect to the
contagion dynamics, large periodic oscillations reminiscent of business
cycles appear.
1 Introduction
Bubbles in financial market are one of the most spectacular stylised fact in
contradiction with General Equilibrium Theory. Economists and “econo-
physicists” have also noticed that the spectral properties of stock, commodi-
ties and foreign exchange return series were far from Gaussian noise: return
series display scale invariance, a property that physicists and economists re-
late to cooperativity (interactions) among the agents. To our knowledge
there have been few explicit models of the phenomenon and our aim in this
contribution is to discuss one of the simplest theoretical approaches.
Basically our model couples interaction among agents with their taton-
nement procedure to get “fair” prices. Both processes have attracted the
attention of modelers, see e.g. Fo¨lmer (1974), Galam (1982, 1991) and Or-
lean (1995) for interactions and herding behaviour and Lesourne (1992) for
adjustment.
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• We suppose that agents are not independent and that their individual
choices are influenced by the choice of their neighbours for whatever
reason, externalities or information;
• Agents initially have some reservation price (the highest price they
would accept for the good) that they adjust to match offers.
In a previous attempt to understand these phenomena, we used a perco-
lation model to describe the information contagion dynamics (Solomon et al
2000, Goldenberg et al 2000, Weisbuch and Solomon 2000, Weisbuch et al
2001). Agents are nodes of a lattice and are susceptible to purchase a good
when its quality meets their expectations after one of their neighbours pur-
chased. Adjustment of qualities and expectations are based on a standard
tatonnement process which we describe further in section 2.2. The result-
ing dynamics were checked by the observation of time series of purchase,
patterns of purchase, and Fourier transform of the time series. A distinc-
tive feature of cooperativity was the observed 1/f 2 spectrum of the purchase
time series. Comparable results were obtained by Plouraboue´ etal (1998)
and Steyer and Zimmermann (2000) who reported 1/f noise when the slow
dynamics is Hebbian learning.
One of the purposes of the present study is to check the genericity of
the previously modeled behavior: we only have a very indirect knowledge of
the reasons why agents decide to purchase a good or not to purchase it, not
to mention the specific algorithm they would use to survey their neighbours
before taking a decision. The previously used percolation approach supposes
that the purchase by one of their neighbours is sufficient to provide a full
knowledge of the quality of the product, while the “counter” (or voting)
dynamics presented here implies that agents survey all their neighbours to
take some average opinion. There might be specific situations for which one
or the other scheme would make more sense, but in general we would like to
know how different would the resulting global dynamics be.
The paper first describes the model. We then give simulation results
for the two different dynamical regimes. After some study of the influence
of parameters we discuss in the conclusion the relevance of the observed
dynamics to business cycles and financial markets.
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2 The INCA model
2.1 Information contagion
A rather standard model of information contagion is based based on cellular
“counters” (also called voters dynamics). Let us consider cellular automata:
binary agents occupy sites of a two dimensional lattice. The decision rule,
buy or not buy, corresponding to state Si = 1 or to state Si = −1,
1 is
based on some combination of private information and information coming
from neighboring (on the lattice) agents. The private information of agent
i is some threshold θi, and information incoming from neighbours is simply
the sum of their individual states. At each time step one agent randomly
selected updates its state by comparing the sum of its neighbours’ states to
its threshold:
Si = 1 iff
∑
j
Sj > θi (1)
Otherwise Si = −1.
Homogeneous counters automata, with identical thresholds, are simple
cellular automata which dynamical attractors depend on the amplitude of the
threshold as compared to the number of neighbours. Lower thresholds (less
than -2) give homogeneous attractors with state 1 for all automata, higher
thresholds (more than +2) give homogeneous attractors with state -1 for all
automata. Intermediate threshold values give coexisting domains of plus and
minus ones which size depends upon thresholds and initial conditions (see
e.g. Weisbuch 1991 for more details).
But we are interested here in inhomogeneous counters with different
thresholds: INCA2 are disordered systems and their dynamical properties
reflect their disordered structure: one observes stable dynamical regimes sep-
arated by finite width phase transitions for which attraction basins depend
up on the particular realisation of disorder. Weisbuch and Boudjema (1999)
have shown for instance that even under a favourable average threshold which
would predict invasion by +1’s in a sea of -1’s, the detailed positions of the
automata initially at state +1 are important. The phenomenon is well-known
1the choice 1 or 0 for buy or not buy, is more standard in economics, but our choice,
inspired from physics, respects symmetry and thus makes computations and mathematical
expressions simpler.
2INhomogeneous Cellular Automata (Vichniac 1986).
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in the physics of phase transitions: germs are initially necessary to the growth
of a stable phase in conditions of supercooling for instance.
2.2 The adjustment model
Let us now be more specific about the interpretation of the threshold in terms
of economics. The threshold which drives the buying behavior of the agent
can be seen as a price difference between how much a seller would like to get
from a product ps and how much pb a buyer is ready to pay for it when the
signal from neighbours would cancel (in other words with an equal number
of buyers and non-buyers in the agent neighborhood).
θi = ps − pb. (2)
A positive threshold would prevent purchase, a negative one would allow it.
The presence of other purchasers in the neighborhood would favour purchase.
(Of course prices have to be expressed in some units consistent with equation
1. Two units in price difference corresponds to a threshold change of one extra
neighbour).
The adjustment process now can be simply stated as:
• When an agent did not purchase upon update (Si = −1), she decreases
her threshold with the hope to be able to be in a better condition to
purchase next time;
• in the opposite case she increases it.
The algorithm is above described as adjustment of a buyer reservation price,
but a symmetrical reasoning for a seller would give the same threshold dy-
namics. In fact we cannot directly suppose a symmetrical reasoning on the
buyer side: it makes a difference whether there is only one seller (monopoly)
and how fast he would react, or whether we have several buyers and what are
the trading relationships between buyers and sellers. Let us then supppose
for the sake of simplicity that only buyers adjust their reservation price.
The adjustment dynamics in the absence of any coupling between agents
would be similar to the simple mechanism describe e.g. by Laffond and
Lesourne (1992) and would yield a similar clearing of the market as described
in Lesourne’s book (1992). The difference here is that we are interested in
multiple purchases by agents and that we couple adjustment and contagion
dynamics.
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3 Simulation results
3.1 The slow adjustment regime
Before a full study of parameters and variants let us try to understand the
simplest case. An obvious parameter of the model is how fast the thresh-
old is adjusted with respect to the buying propagation dynamics. Let us
suppose that at every update, the adjustment amplitude is random and uni-
formly distributed on [0, q]. We further refer to q as the adjustment rate.
Its magnitude has to be compared with the number of neighbours taken into
account in the simulation: we used four. For slow adjustment rate such as
q = 0.1, we expect the dynamics of adjustment to be slow with respect to
the diffusion dynamics. Let us define the relative adjustment rate ρ as the
ratio between the average adjustment, here q/2, and the difference between
thresholds such that isolated individuals among a neighbourhood of either
buyers or non-buyers would take an opposite view to their neighbours, here
8. The slow adjustment regime is such that:
ρ <
2
L
(3)
where L is the width of the square lattice. The rhs term is the inverse of the
time necessary to propagate a position, buying or not buying, across the net,
under the most favourable threshold condition (the term 2 is due to the fact
that we use periodic boundary conditions).
The simulation conditions are then:
• A square lattice of dimension L2 (e.g. 20× 20 for figure 1);
• random3 updating based on the described algorithms;
• The initial configuration of agents is random for the binary state and
thresholds are uniformly distributed on [-1,1].
Figure 1 is a time plot of the average state of agents (fraction of buyers)
and average threshold.
The regular oscillations of agents states and average thresholds obtained
at long time give some indication of the processes which control the dy-
namics. Note that both quantities display relaxation rather than sinusoidal
3at each time step one node randomly chosen is updated according to equation 1 for
its state and section 2.2 for its threshold
5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Time plot of purchases and average thresholds q=0.1 L=20 
Purchasers
Thresholds
Figure 1: Time evolution of the average state of agents and average thresh-
old, in the slow adjustment regime. (average state=1, everyone buys, average
state=-1, no-one buys.). Unit time correspond to updating each site once on
average).
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oscillations, threshold varying as a triangular wave and purchases more like
a square wave which saturates at maximum (all or no agents purchasing).
The two quantities have a phase shift of pi/2: extreme variations of the aver-
age threshold occur when purchases saturate. These observations plus direct
online observations of the lattice dynamics for purchase and threshold can
be easily understood.
Once the lattice is in a saturated condition, say everyone buying, an iso-
lated agent who would choose not to buy needs a threshold much higher than
if she were surrounded by non-buyers. The system has to “wait” until thresh-
olds which were low during the rise of the purchasing behaviour rise again to
allow the apparition of isolated non-buyers. Hence the straight part of the
average threshold evolution corresponding to its slow and regular increase.
But as soon as isolated non-buyers are present, their neighbours need a lower
threshold to switch to no-purchase; a wave of no-purchase propagates across
the lattice. Hence the fast switch observed on the purchase time evolution:
online observation display the growth of non-purchaser germs surrounded by
disappearing domains of purchasers. One single sweep from purchasing to
non-purchasing is the equivalent of a phase transition for which germs are
needed (first order phase transitions). The phenomenon is symmetrical for
purchase and no purchase, hence the observed oscillations.
3.2 The fast adjustment regime
With large networks and fast adjustment rates, the global synchrony between
all agents on the lattice is destroyed. Agent states (purchase/no-purchase)
and thresholds display small homogeneous domains on the lattice. Because
of the randomness of the updating process, some agents easily reach “ec-
centric” (opposed to their neighbours) positions and many domains out of
phase start growing in different places4. This behaviour is observed with
online simulations and displayed on figure 2 at time 100 000.
The change of dynamical regime with adjustment rates q is very smooth
and corresponds to a crossover rather than to a phase transition.
Because of domains asynchrony, oscillations are relatively smaller and
less regular in amplitude in the fast adjustment regime than in the slow
4By contrast, in the slow adjustment regime, many time steps are needed to sweep from
the lower to the upper threshold, and the standard deviation of the threshold is reduced
by the summing process, thus allowing synchrony of agents behaviour.
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Figure 2: Pattern of behaviour at time 100 in the fast adjustment regime.
Adjustment rate q is 0.7. Grey squares correspond to buyers, black squares to
non-buyers. (In the slow adjustment regime domains would be much larger.
Sometimes, consensus across the lattice is achieved).
8
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0 50 100 150 200 250
Time plot of purchases and average thresholds q=0.7 L=80 
Purchasers
Thresholds
Figure 3: Time evolution of the average state of agents and average threshold
in the fast adjustment regime. Oscillation are smaller and less regular in
amplitude than in the slow adjustment regime.
adjustment regime as observed in figure 3. Saturation of the (no)purchaser
fraction is never reached.
Another way to monitor inhomogeneity is to check the spatial autocorre-
lation function of states.
C(d) =
∑
i S(i)S(i+ d)− (
∑
i S(i))
2
L2
(4)
where i is the position of lattice sites and d the translation distance. L2 is
the number of agents.
Figure 4 displays the autocorrelation function for different lattice sizes
in the fast adjustment regime when the adjustment rate q = 0.7. Its fast
decay, over some 4 lattice sites, tells us that the average linear dimension
of purchasing or no-purchasing domains is of order 4 to be compared with
the patterns observed on figure 2. A striking result is that although lattice
linear sizes change by a factor 8, the autocorrelation function are very similar,
implying that the average size of domains is independent of lattice size in the
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Figure 4: Spatial autocorrelation function of the average fraction of buyers
for lattice sizes varying from 20×20 to 160×160. Abscissa is distance in units
of lattice spacing. Note that the correlation length, given by the distance at
which the autocorrelation is zero is nearly invariant with lattice size.
fast adjustment regime. In other words, figure 2 is statistically representative
of any part of a larger lattice.
Scaling
The system has only two parameters, L the lattice dimension and the
average adjustment rate ρ. We would like to know how the characteristic
variable of the dynamics, frequency and amplitude of the oscillations, and
their space dependence through the autocorrelation function, vary with L
and ρ.
Frequencies are surprisingly stable over time and from sample to sample
as opposed to magnitudes. A direct measure on time plots of oscillations
shows that periods T vary as:
T ≃
10L2
q
(5)
This result has a very simple interpretation. The factor L2 is simply the
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number of agents. The period is close to the number of agents multiplied by
a time which scales with average time it takes for threshold to switch between
extremal values of -4 and 4. The threshold dynamics is the rate limiting step
of the overall dynamics.
As seen in figure 3, amplitudes display a lot of variations. A simple way
to average them on time is to measure power, namely the time averaged
squared amplitudes. Even with time averaging over some 800 periods, power
values had to be further averaged over several runs (9 in our measurements)
to further reduce noise. A first result is that for larger values ρ values, ρ > 5,
average power scales as L2 = N the number of agents. If agents behaviour
were oscillating in phase, we would expect power to scale in N2. The scaling
in N implies that N/s patches of constant size s oscillate independently
giving:
P ∼
N
s
Ps ∼ Ns ∼
N
q2
(6)
where Ps is the power of one patch, proportional to s
2. This interpretation is
consistent with our interpretation of autocorrelation measurements and the
observation of small domains. The scaling of s in q−2 is obtained from the
equivalence between the time it takes for the social influence to sweep the
patch and the time it takes to the threshold adjustment to sweep between
the extreme values.
Figure 5 displays the rescaled inverse power (i.e. P
N
) as a function of q
the maximum adjustment rate (q = 8ρ) for N varying from 400 to 6400. The
collapse of the three curves above q = 0.6 is good, the quadratic scaling in q
is approximate.
Figure 6 displays the Fourier power spectrum of the time series of agent
states when q = 1. The large peak around abscissa 30 corresponds to a
frequency of 10 iterations per agent. At larger frequencies, the long tail
corresponds to a 1/f 2 noise. Small scale correlations in agents behaviour
due to local imitation processes are responsible for this long tail. For lower
values of the maximum adjustment rate q, the importance of the peak with
respect to the 1/f 2 noise is increased.
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Figure 5: Rescaled inverse power in the fast adjustment regime, for several
network sizes, L = 20, 40, 80 as a function of the adjustment rate q. When
q > 0.5 one observes a good collapse of simulation data for the rescaling in
N and a quadratic variation in q.
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Figure 6: Power spectrum in the fast adjustment regime, for a large network
(L = 80) and fast adjustment (q = 1) . The frequency scale correspond to
320 updating per agent on average for one frequency unit
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4 Conclusions
The obtained results were based on very simple assumptions on the economic
network structure and on the imitation and adjustment process. But these
results, especially the 1/f 2 noise, should not depend upon the details of
these assumptions. Let us give some directions about the generality of our
hypotheses.
• We based the “voting” process on information processing, but this pro-
cess can be also be accounted for on the basis of “positive externalities”.
Agents can experience increase in the utility of equipments when their
neighbours also own such equipments.
• Who are the agents? The discussion implicitly assumes for simplic-
ity reasons that agents are individuals, but the same reasoning could
apply to firms taking decisions on purchasing goods or equipment or
even making strategic decisions. In this respect the size of the net-
work (number of firms) would be much smaller which could move the
dynamics towards the slow adjustment regime.
• The network topology: a lattice is an extremely regular network which
allows nice pattern observation, but which cannot be considered as a
good model of a socio-economic network. In fact a lattice shares with
real networks the property of having many short loops, which is not
the case of random nets. Anyway the imitation model can be extended
to structures with inhomogeneous local connectivity, small worlds or
scale free networks, by rewriting equation 1 using fraction of sites with
positive or negative state rather than direct summation.
• We discussed random updating of agent states, but one can also intro-
duce other conditions, such as propagation of a purchase wave as in
the Weisbuch and Solomon (2000), Weisbuch etal (2001) percolation
model for which 1/f 2 noise was also observed.
Let us now come to the observations.
• The 1/f 2 noise was expected: such fat tails have been consistently
reported in empirical data from financial markets. The commonly ad-
mitted reason for the fat tails are interactions among agents.
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• The periodic oscillations were unexpected, although their origin be-
comes pretty evident after observation. The most interesting interpre-
tation in real life are business cycles. In this framework the agents
are firms and the network is the “economy”: the set of production,
trade and services which form the economic network. We here have
a possible microscopic theory of business cycles which does not sup-
pose any external trigger such as innovation cycles often suggested by
macro-economists. We probably have to take into account some spe-
cific features of economic networks such as the anisotropic character of
connections (producers/users interactions are different from competi-
tion interactions) to get more precise predictions but some results such
as the increase of the amplitude of activity variation with coupling are
already within the framework of the present model.
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